Introduction
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and local militias thrive on the vacuum of power that afflicts many states in North Africa. The malaise has been exacerbated by the breakdown in governance that followed the Arab Spring's unrest and led terrorist groups and competing militias to expand their areas of operation (Zimmerman 2013) . Decades of support for authoritarian rulers by external actors such as Russia and Iran, the monarchies of the Gulf, and the West, further hollowed out state and society throughout the region to such a degree that the state's monopoly of violence has been eroding. In Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, a plethora of non-state actors now possess means of violence that used to be the sole purview of states. The most dangerous groups are composites of terrorist association and militia that instrumentalize a firebrand version of Islam to pursue an expansionist ideological project whose aim is to overcome conventional sovereignty states.
Further south, political and religious violence has been surging. Better known for episodes of drought and occasional acts of banditry, West Africa has progressively become a battleground for Islamists seeking to impose sharia, rebels seeking independence, transnational traffickers, and former colonial powers struggling to project their influence by bolstering the territorial integrity of states. At the peak of the Malian crisis in 2012, a temporary coalition of Tuareg rebels and VEOs affiliated with Al Qaeda controlled an area about the size of Texas. They were routed by the French-led Opération Serval in 2013. More recently, Boko Haram has been striving to establish a caliphate over a large part of the Northeastern Nigerian border region, killing thousands and forcing more than half a million civilians to flee their country (Zenn 2012 , UNHCR 2015 .
The conflicts in Mali and Nigeria exemplify the complexities of instability fuelled by rebellions, religious extremism, and transnational organized crime in the Trans-Saharan region. It also sheds light on the nature of Trans-Saharan conflicts that are characterized by shifting loyalties of individuals to combatant groups. Personal allegiances of commanders and rank-and-file fighters change as new opportunities arise, military personnel frequently join secessionist rebels, while rebels may occasionally join with VEOs, depending on local circumstances and tribal allegiances (Walther and Christopoulos 2013) . As Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or the Polisario Front illustrate, cross-border mobility is another important part of military strategy (Zenn 2014) . Islamist groups and rebels capitalize on marital, political, and financial ties throughout the region. As a result, they are not confined to one state. Instead, they move freely across sovereign state borders to attack targets, take hostages, and escape from security forces.
Against this background, the objective of this article is to study both the structural and spatial organization of violent extremism in the Trans-Saharan region. Building on the Armed Conflict These spatial patterns of violent extremism suggest that deterrence and containment strategies need to be devised at the regional level rather than at the level of states. The findings have significant implications for collective security and stability operations and transnational coordination. On the one hand, existing institutions need to be reinforced. Yet, regional institutions' ability to solve collective action problems is limited: other than the African Union (Morocco excepted) and the United Nations, many of the affected states do not belong to the same regional organizations. Moreover, these institutions objectives tend to be political and economic. Notably absent are transnational security organizations. Is it mere coincidence that violent transnational non-state actors are strongest and most problematic in a region that is largely devoid of collective security institutions?
VEOs, geography and borders

The geography of VEOs
Space is now widely recognized as a fundamental dimension of terrorists groups, which often conduct operations from a territorial base, leverage geographic havens, compete with sovereign states, and fight for control over aspirational homelands (Cutter et al. 2003 , Flint 2003 , Medina and Hepner 2008 . As a result, an increasing number of scholars are examining social and spatial dimensions of terrorism. As Carley (2006: 3) argues: "If we look only at the social network then the focus of attention is on hierarchies, communication and other social relations.
The addition of events and locations facilitates course of action analysis and enables linkage to various strategic planning tools". Social scientists have hitherto investigated spatio-temporal patterns of terrorist activities along several lines of inquiry: some have considered places and distance by locating terror attacks and violent events and their co-occurrence and projecting social ties on geographic space (Krebs 2002 , Medina and Hepner 2008 , Baghat and Medina 2013 . This approach, which focusses on how proximity can influence the formation of social networks, helps us understand the way terrorist groups leverage resources such as social capital, infrastructure, or institutions, and how they communicate over vast distances (Sageman 2008 ).
Other spatial features, such as territorial homogeneity (Dowd and Raleigh 2013) or contiguity (Flint et al. 2009, Medina and Hepner 2011) , have been investigated to a lesser extent. Radil et al. (2010) , for example, show that rivalry among urban gangs in Los Angeles produces distinct spatial patterns depending on whether the groups are close geographically or topologically.
Spatializing social networks, the authors argue, gives better results than conventional spatial analysis that ignores social interactions or typical SNA that would not consider geography.
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Such developments have been enabled by new algorithmic techniques for clustering and anomaly detection (Skillicorn 2009 ), dynamic network analysis (Breiger et al. 2003 , Carley 2006 , Gelernter and Carley 2015 and geographical information systems (Berrebi and Lakdawalla 2007 , Guo et al. 2007 , Medina and Hepner 2011 , Gao et al. 2013 , Hannigan et al. 2013 ). These new tools can now be applied to large databases, such as the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), Jane's Terrorism (Larémont 2011 , Lacher and Tull 2013 , Sheehan and Porter 2014 . In most of these studies, however, the social networks underlying political and religious movements and the spatial patterns of attacks are considered as two independent variables and are rarely analyzed in a formal way.
The recent evolution of such groups as Boko Haram and AQIM has, however, called this approach into question by showing that the geographical diffusion of VEOs in West Africa follows established social networks among radicals (Guidère 2011 , Menner 2014 . As Perliger and Pedahzur (2011: 46) showed in a slightly different context, "many of the social networks engaging in terrorism existed long before they became involved in terrorism activities". This rings true particularly when VEOs extend their activities across sovereign borders, due to the uncertainty of operating in a foreign environment (Lacher 2012) . In other words, the spatial strategies of VEOs are constrained by their own prior investment in social ties (friends and kin, coreligionists, countrymen) and by the overall structure of the network that favors actors that are structurally central over more peripheral ones. Current mobility patterns do not simply imitate 6 the old rules that governed trans-Saharan mobility in the past; they are necessary to maintain an investment in a social network of hosts and exchange partners without which mobility across the region would not be possible (Retaillé and Walther 2013) .
The effect of borders
Border regions are crucial for the development of terrorist groups (Flint 2003 : 165, Medina and Hepner 2008 : 154, Hudson 2003 . The most obvious reason is that, in many regions of the world, borderlands amount to ungoverned spaces whence terrorist groups can attack distant targets and minimize the risks of reprisals (Migdal 2004 , Korteweg and Ehrhardt 2006 , Brafman Kittner 2007 , Innes 2007 , Gray and LaTour 2010 , Campana and Ducol 2011 . Sunni-dominated areas of the Syrian-Lebanon border, for example, are used as safe havens by Syrian opposition forces, whereas Shia-dominated areas are used by Hezbollah to launch attacks or enter Syria (U.S. In North and West Africa, border sanctuaries are largely found in the Sahel and Sahara where territorial discontinuities between states encourage the development of cross-border warfare (Walther 2014) . Long considered as artifacts of colonial power, borders impose transaction costs that open markets of opportunity for rebels and jihadists that exploit weak states and their lack of intraregional cooperation, making transnational terrorism harder to address than domestic terrorism (Sandler 2011) . Instead of being organized into territorial units, rebels and VEOs cooperate along pre-existing marital, political, and financial networks with political allies and co-religionists that inhabit the area (Wilkinson 2012) . That leaves the impression that they are elusive (Walther and Retaillé 2010) . In a sparsely populated region the size of the United States, holding territory has always been pointless. Instead of garrisoning territory, Trans-Saharan terrorist groups aim to control cities and lines of communication. A similar strategy is adopted by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), who controls of network of cities, roads, and military bases and oil resources across Syria and Iraq without forming a continuous territorial entity. Connected across both shores of the desert, these groups are governed by the fundamental principles of social flexibility and geographic mobility to fight an enemy that mainly relies on hierarchical structures and static armies.
Combining social network and spatial analysis
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset
The analysis relies on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), which provides a comprehensive list of political events by country from 1997 to 2014 Dowd 2015, ACLED 2015a) . The fifth version of the data was used to select 21 countries that were primordially concerned with violent activities in North and West Africa: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tunisia and Togo. Country data were compiled in a unique file and, because our analysis mainly focusses on political violence, only events coded as violent were selected. These include seven categories:
Battle -no change of territory; Battle -Non-state actor overtakes territory; Battle -Government regains territory; Riots and protests; Violence against civilians; and Remote violence. Over the period under consideration, the dataset contains 23,533 violent events involving 1213 different actors.
Since we are looking to gauge the social and spatial organization of VEOs, we selected all violent events involving actors that were clearly identified as VEOs in the database, excluding SNA has a proven track-record of analyzing and disrupting terrorist networks (e.g. Carley et al. 2003 , Sageman 2004 , Everton 2013 , Duijn et al. 2014 ). This has not always been the case; traditionally, terrorist networks were believed to be hierarchical and centralized. This was based on a historical conception of terrorist groups as operating like hierarchical corporations (Stohl and Stohl 2007) . This view has remained popular even in the recent "Global War On Terror" (Zimmerman 2013) . SNA, however, seeks to understand networks by mapping out the ties between the various nodes in the group as they are rather than how they ought to be or are expected to be. This allows investigators to determine the structure and function of both the network as a whole, and the role of each person in the group in relation to others.
To study structural relations between actors involved in violent events we built a table -known as an adjacency matrix -in which the rows and columns contained the name of all the actors. An 9 entry in row a and column b represents a violent event between Actor a and Actor b. We counted the number of times the actors had been mutually involved in clashes and considered the number of fatalities as the entries of the matrix of relations. A zero indicates no tie and a negative value (-1) indicates an event without casualties. Note that because ACLED only reports the number of fatalities by event, it is not possible to assign a precise number of fatalities by group. Since ties between actors are reciprocal, the matrix is undirected and symmetric. The matrix can then be used to produce a graph or sociogram, which is a visual representation of the relationships between actors, and calculate several measures of centrality based on the structural position of each actor.
The spatiality of VEOs: connecting the dots
To understand the spatial strategies of VEOs in the region, we started by mapping violent events listed in the ACLED dataset using their geographical coordinates. In a region where non-state actors are notoriously mobile, locating violent events is, however, not entirely satisfactory because it does not reflect the ability of actors to move throughout states or mobilize personal and tribal networks to strike from a distance. In the absence of reliable data on the movement of VEOs, one of the challenges of our spatial analysis was to understand the spatiality of VEOs and the importance of sovereign borders based on immutable locations. This was achieved by developing two scenarios. The first scenario ("mobility") assumes that violent events follow a linear chain of events, with VEOs moving from one location to the next, possibly across borders, without returning to their original location. This would reflect the strategy of a group under intense pressure from security forces, or, alternatively, of a VEO mastering the constraints of moving in an arid environment. The second scenario ("sanctuary") assumes that violent events are limited to a particular region whence VEOs operate across borders. This scenario supposes a territorial turf and a clear origin of flows, such as the Kabylie region in Algeria for the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or the Maiduguri region in Nigeria for Boko Haram. The difference between the two scenarios is explained in Figure 1 , which presents six events for which the exact location (coded from 1 to 5) is known in two countries (A and B). On the left, groups constantly move from one location to another through four movements, crossing the border on one occasion. On the right, violent events were located in different countries but followed a sanctuary pattern that lead groups to return to their point of origin. In the database, this would be reflected in a succession of events alternating across different countries. Once sorted chronologically, we verified whether two successive violent events were located in the same country (or not) and whether spatial patterns followed a "mobility" or a "sanctuary" scenario by looking at the location of events. The limitation of this approach is that if one group decides to operate exclusively across the border without ever clashing with another group in the same country, no violent event will be recorded and the sanctuary pattern will be impossible to detect using the ACLED database.
Instead of mapping the spatial patterns of each of the Trans-Saharan groups, we aggregate the events in which they were involved. The rationale is that trans-Saharan VEOs form several components of a single, flexible network, rather than independent entities. As reminded by Hagen (2014: 2) , "AQIM overlaps with a number of nominally independent and 'locallyfocused' groups, such as Ansar al Din and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.
These groups are part of the larger AQ family and cannot be separated from AQ and AQIM". Our data, which capture the last three years of the 1990s, highlight the high number of victims resulting from civil wars in Liberia (1989 Liberia ( -1997 Liberia ( and 1999 Liberia ( -2003 , Sierra Leone (1991 Leone ( -2002 , and Guinea-Bissau (1998 -1999 . The return of political stability to Sierra Leone and Liberia at the One of the most interesting features of the network involving VEOs is its low density. With 125 nodes and 175 ties, the density is only 0.011, which means that only 1.1% of potential ties are actually present in the network. The sparsity of ties is typical of networks containing exclusively negative ties because the number of enemies a group can have is often more limited than the potential number of its allies (Huitsig et al. 2012) . Low density aside, the network also has a low level of transitivity, which means that two actors in conflict with a third actor are unlikely to be in conflict with each other (Everett and Borgatti 2014). The density of transitive triads is 0.012, which means that in only 1.2% of the triads (a group of three actors) enemies of enemies are in fact enemies: in most cases (98.8%), enemies of enemies are actually friends. This is especially true for VEOs opposed to government forces: if both AQIM and MUJAO are in conflict with the Algerian military, for example, their common cause makes it less likely for them to be adversaries. Isolates are not shown. The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of ties.
A third interesting aspect of the VEO network is that actors with adverse attributes tend to be in conflict with one other. The tendency to interact more with actors from a different group is known as heterophily (Csaba and Pál 2010) , which is the opposite of homophily (van Mastrigt and Carrington 2014). The preference for heterophilous ties can be verified using the E/I index, which calculates the difference between external (E) and internal (I) ties for each group of actors, divided by the total number of ties. When the 125 actors involved in conflict are divided into six categories (government, rebels, militias, civilians, Islamists, and external forces), we find that the 16 E/I index is high, positive and statistically significant (0.899***). This confirms that VEOs tend to clash with actors that do not belong to their category. But with which ones exactly?
If we report who has been in conflict with whom over the last 20 years and calculate how many victims these confrontations have claimed (Table 1) , we observe that the bloodiest conflicts have seen civilians in conflict with state and non-state actors. Generally speaking, these figures confirm earlier studies that showed that most of the victims of African conflicts were civilians who either died at the hands of state or non-state armed groups, or from the effects of displacement, malnutrition and disease (Williams 2011 , ACLED 2015b . At the actor level, we find that the network is composed of very few highly central VEOs (Table   2 ). In a negative-tie network such as this, being simultaneously in conflict with many others and consequently presenting a high degree centrality score is widely regarded as a liability rather than as an asset (Labianca and Brass 2006) . Negative relationships adversely affect VEOs' outcomes in terms of military operations, reduce the ability of VEOs to coordinate their activities across the region, and limit their ability to cooperate to achieve their political or religious goals.
Most VEOs involved in conflict in
Among VEOs, AQIM is unequivocally the most central actor, irrespective of the centrality measures used. As can be seen in Table 2 , which presents the ten most connected actors in the dataset, AQIM has the highest score in degree centrality and eigenvector centrality.
Degree centrality is a local measure that simply counts the number of ties each group has, whereas eigenvector is a global measure which also takes into account the respective centrality of other actors and indicates whether groups have ties to actors that are themselves in conflict with many other actors. Actors with high eigenvector centrality are well connected to the parts of the network that have the greatest degree of warfare. AQIM is simultaneously involved in many conflicts, and is tied to other actors that also have many enemies, such as the military and police forces of Algeria. MUJAO, GSPC and GIA also occupy a prominent structural position in terms of degree centrality due to their conflicts with civilians, and military and police forces of several African countries. 
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Other prominent actors include Boko Haram, whose structural position as a central hub in a huband-spoke cluster of Nigerian actors explains why it is connected to many other actors who themselves have few connections to one other. As the group is in conflict with virtually everyone, Boko Haram has a high number of ties (or degree) and, therefore, a high degree centrality score. Paradoxically, Boko Haram seems to achieve its goal to establish Islamic law and seize territory in Northern Nigeria despite having virtually no allies, a situation comparable to that of ISIS in the Middle East, which opposes all governments and non-state actorsincluding Al Qaeda -in the region. Some Libyan actors score high (Ansar al-Sharia, Libya
Shield Brigade) but one should note that the Libyan cluster represented here is a partial representation of the multitude of actors in play in this country, due to the fact that Libyan militias, which are particularly numerous in the Libyan conflict, are not represented.
The effect of borders
The literature presumes that borders matter because they circumscribe sovereign territories that Despite these institutional initiatives, the level of regional cooperation remained low, because 
Conclusion: Building regional security organizations
The aim of this article was to examine the structure and spatial patterns of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in North-West Africa, a region characterized by growing political instability over the last 20 years. Building on publicly available data, we analyzed how actors in conflict were structurally connected and found that the network involving VEOs had a low density, a low level of transitivity, and contained few central actors. These characteristics are typical of negative-tie networks. In the region, AQIM is unequivocally the most connected VEO, both in terms of the overall number of actors with which the group is in conflict, and the respective centrality of AQIM's enemies. In other words, AQIM is connected to many other groups that are themselves involved in many conflicts. In network terms, this is a liability because it reduces the number of potential alliances and opportunities for collaboration with other groups, denies access to resources and information for political campaigns and military operations, and, in general terms, reduces the structural autonomy of highly central actors. As might be expected from a network composed of negative ties, the network involving VEOs is extremely heterophilous, which means that VEOs tend to clash with actors with adverse attributes. This is particularly true for civilians and governments. Conflicts between VEOs and these two categories are orders of magnitude more deadly than conflicts between VEOs and militias, rebels, and external forces, such as the United Nations or foreign armies. off. Precedent suggests that states outside the region will always play a supporting rather than a lead role. In addition to supporting UN capacity-building efforts already underway, Western governments should be prepared to mount a comprehensive Whole-of-Government effort in support of local authorities that will minimize local footprint while optimizing outcomes.
Second, the findings suggest that the social and spatial mobility of VEOs is one of their major strengths. Similar to the Arab revolt of the 20 th century during which "a highly mobile, highly equipped type of army, of the smallest size" defeated the immobile and defensive Ottoman
Turkish army, military operations of Trans-Saharan VEOs are "more like naval warfare than ordinary land operations, in their mobility, their ubiquity, their independence of bases and communications, their lack of ground features, of fixed directions, of fixed points" (Lawrence 1920: 14) . This makes it particularly difficult for intelligence agencies to predict their 
